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their structure from concrete image schemas (but see Kranjec and 
Chatterjee, 2010). For example, in natural language people often 
use spatial terms when they talk about time (e.g., the meeting has 
been moved forward), which suggests that representations for space 
and time are partially overlapping (see also Walsh, 2003). Initially, 
evidence for such mappings came from linguistic expressions, but 
more recently results from behavioral experiments have supported 
the cognitive metaphor theory (Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; 
Richardson et al., 2003; Meier and Robinson, 2004; Spivey et al., 
2005; Casasanto, 2008; Van Dantzig, 2009; Boot and Pecher, 2010, 
2011; Zanolie et al., 2011; Sell and Kaschak, 2011).
A second proposal explaining how abstract concepts are 
grounded in sensory–motor simulations posits an important role 
for situations. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) argued that 
the specific situations in which abstract concepts occur might be 
mentally simulated. To investigate this idea they asked participants 
to list properties for concepts at varying levels of abstraction. Their 
results confirmed that situational properties were important for 
abstract concepts. On this account, numbers might get their mean-
ing from situational information such as when the number refers to 
a quantity of something (seven pairs of shoes) in a relevant context 
(the shoe shop). Therefore, numbers should have richer representa-
tions in concrete contexts than without such a context.
The metaphor explanation for number representations is sup-
ported by the spatial numerical association of response codes 
(SNARC) effect. Many researchers have suggested that numbers 
are represented visuo-spatially on a mental number line. The best 
known effect is the horizontal SNARC effect (e.g., Dehaene et al., 
1993) although there are a few studies that also showed a vertical 
SNARC effect for hand responses (Ito and Hatta, 2004; Gevers et al., 
2006; Ristic et al., 2006) and eye movement responses (Schwartz 
and Keus, 2004). Participants respond faster with the left hand 
to low numbers than to high number, and faster with the right 
hand to high numbers than to low numbers (see Gevers et al., 2010 
IntroductIon
If you would ask someone whether seven pairs of shoes is a lot or a 
little, the person would probably respond that this depends on the 
context. For example, it would be a little to have in a shoe shop but 
a lot to bring on a weekend to Paris (at least for sensible people). 
In order to evaluate magnitude one needs to mentally compare the 
number to a reference quantity such as an approximate number 
of shoes in a regular shoe shop or in an overnight bag. In the pre-
sent study we investigated the mental representation of number 
magnitude. In particular, we compared to what extent numbers in 
concrete contexts (e.g., seven pairs of shoes) and numbers in abstract 
contexts (e.g., 7) have spatial representations.
Because number meaning can vary between very concrete and 
very abstract, depending on the context, the representation of num-
bers provides an interesting case for grounded theories of cognition 
(Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff and Núñez, 2000). On one 
end of the continuum numbers refer to perceptible quantities of 
concrete stuff such as shoes and oranges, and on the other end 
numbers are used to refer to things that have no perceptible refer-
ents in the world such as negative numbers and square roots. Much 
of the empirical support for the grounded cognition framework 
comes from studies that showed sensory–motor grounding for rep-
resentations of concrete objects and actions, but so far not many 
studies have shown sensory–motor grounding for abstract concepts 
(Pecher et al., 2011). Since abstract concepts are an essential part 
of cognition, explaining how abstract concepts are represented by 
sensory–motor simulations is a critical challenge for the grounded 
framework (Machery, 2007; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Borghi 
et al., 2011; Dove, 2011).
Several researchers have proposed that abstract concepts are 
grounded in sensory–motor simulations by metaphorical mappings 
between abstract concept and concrete, spatial domains (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Gibbs, 1994, 2005). On 
this account, mental representations of abstract concepts take 
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 magnitudes such as a row of shoes or a stack of books that actually 
have spatial dimensions. A study by Bergen et al. (2007) suggests 
that vertical spatial representations might be restricted to situations 
and events that refer to concrete vertical space. They investigated 
the effect of described motion on spatial attention along the verti-
cal midline. They found that sentences with concrete movements 
(e.g., the mule climbed) interfered with processing of an unrelated 
visual stimulus, but no such effect was found for sentences with 
abstract movements (e.g., the cost climbed). Bergen et al. (2007) 
argued that representations of concrete situations interfered with 
visual processing because they use the same resources. Abstract 
representations do not involve visual simulation, however, and thus 
do not interfere with visual processing.
On the other hand, numbers in abstract contexts may need 
grounding in the spatial domain precisely because they lack per-
ceptual properties. Several studies have obtained effects of abstract 
representations on spatial attention, suggesting that these repre-
sentations are grounded in spatial image schemas (Richardson 
et al., 2003; Meier and Robinson, 2004; Van Dantzig, 2009). These 
findings are predicted by cognitive metaphor theorists, who claim 
that abstract concepts are understood by metaphorical mappings 
between abstract and concrete domains. Whereas mental simula-
tion of visual details interferes with perceptual processing, effects 
of image schemas on spatial attention should facilitate processing 
of visual stimuli (Estes et al., 2008).
In the present study we investigated how processing of visual 
stimuli at different locations is affected by numbers in concrete and 
abstract contexts. Because the spatial position of a number is rela-
tive to other numbers (Reynvoet and Brysbaert, 1999; Nathan et al., 
2009), we asked participants to make relative magnitude judgments 
to numbers in either a concrete or an abstract context. To assess 
the activation of spatial image schemas the magnitude judgment 
was followed by an unrelated stimulus (the letter p or q) in a spatial 
location that was either congruent or incongruent with the image 
schematic location of the number. If spatial attention is affected by 
number magnitude, identification of the letter should be facilitated 
in congruent positions compared to incongruent positions.
The letter identification task has been used in numerous stud-
ies that investigated effects on spatial attention (e.g., Meier and 
Robinson, 2004; Meier et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Van Dantzig, 
2009). The advantage of using a secondary task is that in the experi-
mental set-up magnitude judgment (the first task) is not related to 
spatial position, and letter identification (the second task) is not 
related to either spatial position or magnitude judgment. Proctor 
and Cho (2006) have suggested that congruency effects in binary 
tasks can be explained by polarity alignment. This effect occurs 
if stimulus and response dimensions have polarity, that is, can be 
coded as + (plus) and − (minus). Proctor and Cho (2006), but see 
Pecher et al., 2010 assume that in spatial dimensions, above and 
right are coded as +. They also assume that “yes” responses are coded 
as +. Therefore, the polarity principle predicts that “yes” responses 
will be faster when they are aligned with stimuli or response sides 
that are also + (i.e., above or right). In the letter identification task 
such alignment effects will not play a role because the “p” or “q” 
response does not have an obvious polarity. Even if participants 
would code the responses as + and −, however, this would not affect 
the overall results, because “p” and “q” responses are collapsed.
for similar effects with verbal responses) even when magnitude is 
irrelevant to the task, as in parity judgment. Such findings could be 
interpreted as showing that participants represent numbers along 
a horizontal mental number line with small numbers on the left 
and large numbers on the right of the continuum. On an alterna-
tive account, however, the SNARC effect could be attributed to 
processes that occur during response selection (Keus and Schwarz, 
2005; Keus et al., 2005; Müller and Schwarz, 2007) or to polarity 
alignment (Proctor and Cho, 2006; Landy et al., 2008; Santens and 
Gevers, 2008; Bae et al., 2009). If the effect can be attributed to 
response selection, no underlying mental representation needs to 
be assumed to explain the SNARC effect. Thus, at present there is 
no agreement yet as to whether the SNARC effect indicates a spatial 
representation of numbers.
Stronger evidence for a spatial representation of numbers is 
provided by studies that show effects of number magnitude on 
spatial attention (Fischer et al., 2003; Nicholls et al., 2008; Salillas 
et al., 2008). Fischer et al. (2003) found that participants were faster 
to detect a target at the left when it was preceded by a low digit 
(one or two) and faster to detect a target at the right when preceded 
by a high digit (eight or nine). These attention effects indicate 
automatic activation of a spatial representation of numbers on a 
horizontal dimension. Unfortunately, the effect on spatial atten-
tion is not obtained very consistently (Galfano et al., 2006; Ristic 
et al., 2006; Lindemann et al., 2008; Zanolie and Pecher, 2011). In 
the attentional paradigm spatial information might be less salient 
than in the traditional SNARC studies because spatial information 
is not relevant for the response. Zanolie and Pecher (2011) showed 
that the effect of number magnitude on spatial attention critically 
depends on the relevance of magnitude in the task context. Thus, 
there is some evidence that number representation affects spatial 
attention although the effect is probably due to active rather than 
automatic processing of number magnitude.
The SNARC effect has been investigated mostly in the horizontal 
direction. Linguistic sources, however, provide very little evidence 
for a horizontal mental number line but much evidence for a verti-
cal mental number line. In natural language vertical words are often 
used to talk about magnitude. For example, people might say prices 
are high, mortgage rates dropped, incomes can rise or heat is turned 
up or down (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff and Núñez, 2000; Bergen et al., 
2007). Why would they not say that incomes are moving to the right 
and heat is turned left? The systematic way in which vertical but not 
horizontal terms are used for magnitude suggests that magnitude 
is represented in terms of verticality (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
Therefore, it may be the case that in representations of magnitude 
vertical orientation is more important than horizontal orientation. 
In the present study we investigated whether thinking about mag-
nitude directed spatial attention vertically or horizontally.
A second goal of the present study was to investigate whether 
spatial attention is affected differently by magnitude in concrete 
(e.g., seven pairs of shoes in a shop) and abstract (e.g., seven) con-
texts. So far, most evidence for spatial number representations has 
been obtained with numbers in abstract contexts. In the present 
study we presented numbers either in a concrete, natural context 
or in a more abstract context of just other numbers. On the one 
hand we might expect that numbers in concrete contexts are more 
closely associated to spatial directions, because they refer to  concrete 
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(weinig – Dutch for few), the letter p, and the letter q. Participants 
were instructed to make magnitude judgments by choosing few or 
many. A sentence was presented in the center of the screen until 
a response was made. Then, 200 ms after the response, the letter 
p or q (28 pt Garamond) was presented at the top or bottom of 
the screen which had to be identified as quickly and accurately 
as possible by pressing the corresponding button. The next trial 
started 500 ms after the response to the target was made or after 
the feedback. Feedback (fout – Dutch for error) was provided for 
1500 ms after incorrect responses to the letter targets. Twenty prac-
tice trials preceded the 80 experimental trials. The experimental 
sentences were presented in random order in two blocks, with the 
restriction that sentences that contained the same quantity were 
presented in different blocks. Between the two blocks participants 
could take a break and feedback on their accuracy in the first block 
was provided.
results
Four items were removed from the analysis because fewer than 
60% of the participants gave the intended magnitude response 
(Two in the many and two in the few condition). We calculated 
mean reaction times and accuracy for the letter identification 
responses. Incorrect responses (to prime or target, 8.1%) and 
responses more than 2 SD from the subject’s mean (4.2%) were 
excluded from the reaction time analyses. Mean reaction times 
and error rates are presented in Figure 1. In the reaction times we 
obtained a significant interaction between magnitude and verti-
cal position, F(1, 31) = 4.75, MSE = 732.6, η2 = 0.13, p < 0.05. 
Participants were faster to identify a letter presented at the top 
when they first read a sentence in which the magnitude was 
many compared to a few, t(31) = 5.08, SEM = 5.08, η2 = 0.24, 
p < 0.0001. Responses to letters at the bottom of the screen 
were not different between conditions, t(31) = 1.49, SEM = 5.1, 
η2 = 0.03, p > 0.10. Responses to letters were faster in the many 
than in the few condition, F(1, 31) = 4.58, MSE = 1478.7, 
η2 = 0.13, p < 0.05, and responses were faster to letters at the 
top than the bottom of the screen,, F(1, 31) = 5.38, MSE = 3421, 
η2 = 0.15, p < 0.05.
In the error rates we also obtained an interaction effect between 
position and magnitude, F(1, 31) = 5.06, MSE = 0.000, η2 = 0.14, 
p < 0.05. None of the other effects reached significance.
experIment 2
Next we investigated if the magnitude-position congruency effect 
could be replicated with quantities in an abstract context of just 
other numbers. As in Experiment 1, participants made relative mag-
nitude judgments. In Experiment 2 the numbers 0–100 were used 
and participants judged magnitude by comparing each number 
to 50.
method
Participants
Participants were 32 students from the same pool who had not 
participated in Experiment 1.
Materials
The numbers 0–49 and 51–100 were used.
experIment 1
In Experiment 1 we presented sentences in which a number was 
presented in a natural context. Participants decided whether the 
magnitude was relatively few or many (the Dutch words weinig and 
veel were used, which do not refer to height and can be used for 
both mass and count nouns). Whether the magnitude was relatively 
few or many depended on the situation, because the same absolute 
numbers appeared in both conditions (e.g., The man had two books 
in his bookcase vs. The man read two books a day). Thus, participants 
had to use the situation in order to make a magnitude judgment. 
Magnitude judgments were followed by identification of a letter p 
or q which appeared at the top or bottom of the screen (as in the 
study by Meier and Robinson, 2004).
If magnitude is represented by vertical position we expected that 
attention would shift to the top for relatively high magnitudes and 
to the bottom for relatively low magnitudes. This attention shift 
should facilitate identification of targets in the congruent position 
compared to targets in the incongruent position. It should be noted 
that we did not use quantities that explicitly referred to vertical 
positions (e.g., we did not use items like the tree was 6 meters tall). 
Neither did we use words that referred to vertical movement or 
direction (e.g., dropped, up). Thus, any effect on vertical attention 
was due to the representation of the concept magnitude rather 
than to the literal orientation of actions or objects mentioned in 
the sentence.
methods
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate psychology students at the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam received course credit for participating. All 
participants were fluent speakers of Dutch.
Materials
All instructions and materials were in Dutch. We created 40 sen-
tences in the few condition containing a relatively small quantity 
and 40 sentences in the many condition containing a relatively 
large quantity (examples are shown in the Appendix). The same 
absolute quantities were used in the few and many conditions, so 
whether it was few or many depended on the sentence context and 
not on the absolute number. Different kinds of quantity indica-
tions were used (e.g., 100 meters, 10 minutes, 10 euro). No words 
were used that referred to vertical position or movement. Across 
participants, sentences were counterbalanced over the target letter 
identity, target letter position, and block order. Each combination 
of letter identity and letter position was used equally often in each 
condition and block. Twenty-one additional sentences were created 
for practice and instruction.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on PCs separated by walls. 
Participants responded by pressing a button on a response box 
that had five aligned buttons. Four different response mappings 
were used, such that participants used two fingers of each hand 
to respond, and used one hand for each task so that the two fin-
gers of the same hand were used to make the two responses in 
one task. Response mapping was varied between subjects. Buttons 
were labeled with the letter v (veel – Dutch for many), the letter w 
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an explicit reference point was given for both types of stimuli. In 
addition, the value of the reference point varied between trials 
for both types of stimuli.
method
Participants
Thirty-two students from the same pool who had not participated 
in Experiments 1 and 2 participated for course credits.
Materials
The same materials as in Experiments 1 and 2 were used. In addi-
tion, all prime sentences and numbers (on which the magnitude 
judgment was made) were now preceded by a reference sentence 
or reference number that provided an explicit reference point for 
the prime. Thus, the order of events for each trial was: reference – 
magnitude stimulus – letter stimulus. For each magnitude sentence 
from Experiment 1 we created a referent sentences which contained 
a different quantity in the same context (e.g., 60,000 people can be 
seated in the stadium) as the magnitude sentence (e.g., 80 people 
were seated in the stadium).
To prevent participants simply comparing the two quantities 
from referent and magnitude sentence without considering the 
situation half of the referent sentences were replaced by fillers that 
had the same quantity in a different context (e.g., 80 people attended 
the business meeting). Sentences used as experimental trials and 
fillers were counterbalanced between subjects. For each magni-
tude number from Experiment 2 we selected two different referent 
numbers. Referent numbers could be at large or small numerical 
distances from the magnitude numbers, and were chosen such that 
the absolute size of the referent was not predictive of the response.
In both blocks the target task was identification of the letters p 
and q at the top or bottom of the screen as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Procedure
The same procedures as in Experiment 1 and 2 were used. One block 
had the same procedure as Experiment 1 except that the magnitude 
sentence was preceded by a referent sentence. The other block had 
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that prior 
to the letter identification task participants judged whether the 
number was a few or many compared to 50. Twenty numbers were 
used for practice; the remaining 80 numbers were used as experi-
mental trials. Counterbalancing was the same as in Experiment 1, 
and in addition odd and even numbers were also counterbalanced 
across letter position.
results
The same data analysis procedure was used as for Experiment 1. 
The results are displayed in Figure 1. Incorrect responses (5.3%) 
and remaining outliers (4.6%) were removed. In the reaction times 
we obtained no interaction effect between magnitude and vertical 
position, F < 1 nor in the error rates, F(1, 31) = 1.13, MSE = 0.001, 
η2 = 0.04, p > 0.25.
experIment 3
In Experiment 1 we found that number magnitude directed spatial 
attention, whereas no such effect was observed in Experiment 
2. The main difference between the experiments was that the 
numbers in Experiment 1 referred to concrete situations and in 
Experiment 2 to abstract situations. This suggests that the verti-
cal representation of magnitude is activated more strongly when 
people represent numbers that refer to concrete situations than 
numbers that refer to abstract situations. Besides abstractness, 
however, there were a few other procedural differences between 
the two experiments. In order to directly compare the two types 
of number representation we ran an additional experiment in 
which we made the two tasks more similar. In particular, we con-
trolled for two differences between Experiments 1 and 2. First, 
in Experiment 1 the reference point (the “normal” magnitude 
in that context) was implicit, whereas it was explicitly provided 
in Experiment 2. Second, the reference point was variable in 
Experiment 1 because it depended on the context. In Experiment 
2, however, it was fixed (i.e., it was always 50). In Experiment 3 we 
presented numbers in both concrete and abstract contexts, and 
Figure 1 | reaction times and error rates for the letter identification task in experiments 1 (Concrete Context) and 2 (Abstract Context). Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean difference for adjacent bars.
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compared to the many condition, although this difference was 
not statistically significant, t(63) = 1.57, SEM = 6.06, η2 = 0.012, 
p > 0.05. In the error rates we obtained no significant interaction 
effect, F < 1.
For trials that were preceded by numbers in abstract contexts, 
there was no significant interaction between magnitude and verti-
cal position in the reaction times, F < 1, or in the error rates, F(1, 
63) = 1.65, MSE = 0.001, η2 = 0.025, p > 0.20. A main effect of 
vertical position showed that participants responded faster to let-
ters at the bottom than at the top, F(1, 63) = 8.24, MSE = 1672.8 
η2 = 0.12, p < 0.01.
experIment 4
The previous results suggest that numbers in concrete contexts 
direct vertical spatial attention but numbers in abstract contexts do 
not. A possible explanation is that numbers in concrete situations 
have a mainly vertical orientation, whereas numbers in abstract 
situations have a mainly horizontal orientation. This explanation 
would be consistent with the SNARC effect and with effects of 
number magnitude on spatial attention, which are usually obtained 
with numbers in abstract contexts. The effects of number on spatial 
attention are not very robust, however, and appear to depend on 
how strongly numerical magnitude information is activated by 
the number (Galfano et al., 2006; Ristic et al., 2006; Lindemann 
et al., 2008; Zanolie and Pecher, 2011). An alternative explanation 
is that numbers in concrete contexts activate spatial representations 
more strongly than numbers in abstract contexts, irrespective of the 
spatial orientation. To distinguish between these two explanations 
we used the same design as in Experiment 3 except that the letters 
in the letter identification task were presented at the left and right 
rather than top and bottom of the screen.
method
Participants
Thirty-one students from the same pool who had not participated 
in any of the previous experiments participated for course credits.
the same procedure as in Experiment 2 except that each magni-
tude number was preceded by a referent number. Participants were 
instructed to press the middle button (labeled sentence1/number1) 
after they processed the referent (sentence or number) and to use it 
as a comparison for the next stimulus. After making the magnitude 
judgment the target letter p or q was presented at the top or bottom 
of the screen. Assignment of sentences to experimental and filler 
trials was counterbalanced across participants, as was the order of 
sentence and number blocks. At the end of the experiment we asked 
participants whether they had any hypotheses about the purpose of 
the experiment.
results
None of the participants guessed the purpose of the experiment 
correctly. The mean reaction times and error rates are displayed 
in Figure 2. The same data analysis procedure was used as for 
Experiments 1 and 2. Incorrect responses (4.4% in the sentence 
condition and 5.0% in the number condition) and remaining 
outliers (3.8% in the sentence condition and 7.0% in the number 
condition) were removed.
The results of Experiment 3 are consistent with those of 
Experiments 1 and 2. The three-way interaction effect (magni-
tude × vertical position × type of quantity) approached significance 
in the reaction times, F(1, 63) = 2.86, MSE = 1630.3, η2 = 0.043 
p = 0.096 but not in the error rates, F < 1. This marginal interac-
tion indicated that the interaction effect between magnitude and 
vertical position was different between numbers in the two types 
of contexts.
For trials that were preceded by numbers in concrete con-
texts, the interaction effect between magnitude and vertical posi-
tion approached significance, F(1, 63) = 3.60, MSE = 2349.9, 
η2 = 0.054, p = 0.062. Participants responded faster to a letter 
at the top when they first read a sentence in the many condi-
tion compared to the few condition, t(63) = 2.22, SEM = 6.06, 
η2 = 0.042, p < 0.05, whereas participants responded faster to a 
letter at the bottom when they first read a sentence in the few 
Figure 2 | reaction times and error rates for the letter identification task in experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error of the mean difference for 
adjacent bars.
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For trials that were preceded by numbers in abstract contexts, 
there was no significant interaction between magnitude and hori-
zontal position, F < 1 for reaction times and F(1, 30) = 1.17, p > 0.20 
for error rates. A main effect of magnitude showed that participants 
responded faster to letters following a “few” decision than following a 
“many” decision, F(1, 30) = 11.58, MSE = 3755.3 η2 = 0.28, p < 0.01.
General dIscussIon
In four experiments we investigated the effect of magnitude rep-
resentations on spatial attention. Participants made magnitude 
decisions to numbers presented in a concrete or abstract context. 
Subsequently, a target letter was presented at the top or bottom 
(Experiments 1–3) or the left or right (Experiment 4) of the com-
puter screen. We found that identification of target letters was 
influenced by the magnitude decision. Lower magnitudes directed 
attention to the bottom or left of the screen and higher magnitudes 
directed attention to the top or right of the screen. This was only the 
case, however, when magnitude decisions were made to numbers 
in concrete contexts. When numbers were presented in abstract 
contexts no effect of magnitude on spatial attention was observed.
The interaction between magnitude and spatial position was not 
due to the response itself, as has been suggested for the SNARC effect 
(Keus and Schwarz, 2005; Keus et al., 2005; Müller and Schwarz, 2007; 
Landy et al., 2008; Santens and Gevers, 2008; Bae et al., 2009). In our 
experiments, the target response (p or q) was unrelated to letter posi-
tion, magnitude decision, and the congruency between position and 
quantity. Even if participants had used a response mapping between 
the magnitude response (few or many) and response on the target (p or 
q) this cannot explain the results because the data in each condition are 
based on equal numbers of p and q responses. Thus, any positive and 
negative effects of such mapping would have been collapsed into one 
average for each condition. Therefore, the interaction between mag-
nitude and spatial position on target identification is better explained 
by differences in spatial attention for low and high magnitudes.
Our finding that the effect of magnitude on spatial attention 
was larger in concrete than abstract contexts was surprising for two 
reasons. First, some researchers have argued that abstract concepts 
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were the same as in Experiment 3 with 
two exceptions. Most important, in the target task the letters p and 
q were presented at the left and right on the computer screen (in the 
vertical center position). In addition, for the magnitude sentences 
we used only the same context referent sentence. Twenty additional 
fillers were created in which the magnitude sentence was preceded 
by a same number, different context referent sentence.
results
None of the participants guessed the purpose of the experiment 
correctly. The mean reaction times and error rates are displayed 
in Figure 3. The same data analysis procedure was used as for the 
previous Experiments. Incorrect responses (3.1% in both sentence 
and number condition) and remaining outliers (9.9% in the sen-
tence condition and 8.3% in the number condition) were removed.
The results of Experiment 4 basically replicated those of 
Experiment 3 and showed similar effects for horizontal and 
vertical spatial orientation. The three-way interaction effect 
( magnitude × horizontal position × type of quantity) approached 
significance, F(1, 30) = 3.07, MSE = 5135.2, η2 = 0.093 p = 0.090 
for reaction times and F(1, 30) = 2.77, MSE = 0.0001, η2 = 0.084 
p = 0.011 for error rates. This interaction indicated that the interac-
tion effect between magnitude and horizontal position was different 
between the two types of contexts.
For trials that were preceded by numbers in concrete contexts, 
the interaction effect between magnitude and horizontal position 
was significant, F(1, 30) = 9.02, MSE = 1699.1, η2 = 0.23, p < 0.01. 
Participants responded faster to a letter at the left when they first 
read a sentence in the few condition compared to the many con-
dition, t(30) = 2.41, SEM = 12.00, p < 0.05, whereas participants 
responded faster to a letter at the right when they first read a sen-
tence in the many compared to the few condition, t(30) = 1.80, 
SEM = 8.63, p = 0.08. Overall, participants responded faster to 
letters at the left than at the right, F(1, 30) = 10.62, MSE = 5406.9, 
η2 = 0.26, p < 0.01. In the error rates we obtained no significant 
interaction effect, F < 1.
Figure 3 | reaction times and error rates for the letter identification task in experiment 4. Error bars represent standard error of the mean difference for 
adjacent bars.
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that spatial attention induced by number magnitude is weak and 
depends on the relevance and depth of number processing in the 
task (Galfano et al., 2006; Ristic et al., 2006; Lindemann et al., 2008; 
Zanolie and Pecher, 2011). Judging the magnitude of seven pairs of 
shoes in a shop might result in a richer representation of the relative 
magnitude than judging the magnitude of 7 compared to 23. With 
this assumption differences in depth of processing might explain 
the differences between abstract and concrete context. Because our 
paradigm differed in several ways from those used in prior studies 
one may ask whether previous findings have any bearing on our 
results. First, the response categories, few and many, are quantifiers. 
One could argue that quantifiers are processed differently than 
absolute numbers, for example because they are less exact. However, 
the stimuli still contained exact numbers, so it seems unlikely that 
participants did not process exact numerical information. Second, 
attention was measured in a letter identification task rather than a 
target detection task (i.e., present/absent decision). Although both 
tasks should be affected by manipulations of spatial attention, they 
may still differ in how they are affected by unrelated tasks. Third, in 
previous studies the interval between presentation of the number 
and that of the target was short. In our study, the target stimulus 
was time-locked to the magnitude decision and thus varied with 
decision speed. Bearing in mind these differences, we tentatively 
argue that the effect of magnitude on spatial attention appears to 
depend on the depth and relevance of number meaning activation.
The assumption that grounding in spatial representations 
depends on the depth of number representations leads to the 
question how more superficial representations can still result in 
good performance. We propose that experienced number users 
have developed shortcuts that allow them to perform certain tasks 
without activating a rich and grounded meaning of numbers. For 
example, after learning the multiplication tables students can 
answer multiplication questions without even fully understanding 
the concept of multiplication. Such associative knowledge might be 
sufficient to perform simple tasks (such as magnitude judgment) 
in abstract contexts. Barsalou et al. (2008; see also Simmons et al., 
2008) have proposed a similar mechanism for language processing. 
They argue that in some linguistic tasks, participants do not need 
to fully simulate a concept but instead can base their responses on 
simple word associations. It is possible that experienced number 
users can rely on a similar set of associative links between num-
bers in simple number tasks. This idea is supported by findings 
that participants sometimes treat numbers represented by fingers 
as symbolic (Di Luca et al., 2010). Thus, even though the exact 
number is presented in an analog form processing benefits from a 
symbolic representation. Such findings indicate that number pro-
cessing using associative shortcuts is possible and in some cases 
perhaps even more efficient, for example in simple or over-learned 
tasks. When more meaningful processing is required, however, as 
with numbers in a more concrete context, representations involve 
sensory–motor simulations, including metaphorical mappings.
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are grounded in sensory–motor processing by metaphorical map-
pings (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Gibbs, 1994, 
2005). On this account, abstract concepts are understood by meta-
phorical mappings between the abstract concept and concrete, spatial 
domains. Such mappings should be more essential to understand 
numbers in abstract contexts than in concrete contexts. Abstract 
numbers have no grounding in sensory–motor processing whereas 
numbers in concrete contexts can be simulated by sensory–motor 
processing. Thus, abstract numbers should activate image schemas 
to a larger extent than concrete numbers. The present results do not 
support this account because we showed that numbers in concrete 
contexts have a larger effect on both vertical and horizontal spatial 
attention than numbers in abstract contexts. A possible metaphori-
cal explanation might be that alternative mappings were used for 
abstract numbers. For example, magnitude might be represented 
as motion along a path (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000) or as values in a 
non-spatial sensory domain (Núñez et al., in press). Although we 
cannot exclude these alternatives based on the present data, the spatial 
number line appears to be the most “natural” grounding, at least for 
educated Europeans (Núñez et al., in press). Thus, it seems reason-
able to assume that if participants in our study used metaphorical 
mappings these should most likely have been vertical or horizontal.
Second, even if the effect on spatial attention was the same for 
concrete and abstract magnitudes, the positive effect of concrete mag-
nitudes should have been opposed by a negative interference effect. 
Spatial congruency effects might be explained by two opposing mecha-
nisms (Estes et al., 2008). First, a representation might direct visual 
attention to the congruent spatial location just as arrows or verbal 
commands (left, up) do. As a result, target processing at the congruent 
location is facilitated compared to target processing at incongruent 
locations. Second, simulation of perceptual experiences with objects 
might occupy the same resources as those needed to identify the visual 
stimulus. This will cause interference similar to the Perky effect (Craver-
Lemley and Reeves, 1992; Bergen et al., 2007) at the congruent location. 
For example, mental simulation of cowboy hat will interfere more with 
perception of stimuli in a high position than mental simulation of 
cowboy boot. Interference should only be expected for concrete and 
not for abstract concepts, because abstract concepts do not have the 
perceptual details that might compete for resources with visual per-
ception. Facilitation, on the other hand, might be expected for both 
concrete and abstract concepts. On this account, more facilitation is 
expected for abstract than concrete magnitudes, because for the con-
crete magnitudes the effect is counteracted by perceptual interference.
Our finding of larger facilitation for concrete than abstract magni-
tudes seems at odds with this idea that concrete concepts cause more 
visual interference than abstract concepts. The contexts described 
by our stimuli, however, did not have a specific spatial direction. For 
example, seven pairs of shoes in a shoe shop might have any spatial lay-
out. Therefore, any visual interference caused by perceptual details of 
the concrete contexts would not be systematically related to magnitude 
and thus would not affect the interaction between magnitude and let-
ter position. Although our results thus do not necessarily contradict 
the interference account, it does not explain why concrete magnitude 
had a larger effect on spatial attention than abstract magnitude.
It is possible that magnitude judgments in concrete contexts 
required deeper or richer processing than those in abstract con-
texts. In that case, our results would be consistent with findings 
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appendIx
Sentences used in experiments 1, 3, and 4. Approximate translations are given in brackets.
Few Many
De oude man had 2 boeken in de kast staan. De oude man las 2 boeken per dag.
[The old man had 2 books in his bookcase.] [The old man read 2 books a day.]
Mijn oma woont 100 meter van mijn huis vandaan. Er stond een rij van 100 meter voor de kassa.
[My grandma lives 100 meters from my house.] [There was a 100 meter line at the check-out.]
De bouwvakker dronk op de snikhete dag 1 liter water. Het meisje dronk in een keer 1 liter cola op.
[On the sweltering day the construction worker drank 1 liter of water.] [The girl drank 1 liter of cola in one go.]
De visite at een halve taart op. De man at een halve taart op na het avondeten.
[The guests finished half a cake.] [After his dinner the man finished half a cake.]
Mijn werk is 1 km van mijn huis vandaan. Mijn auto staat 1 km van mijn huis vandaan. 
[My work is 1 km from my house.] [My car is parked 1 km from my house.]
Haar middel heeft een omtrek van 60 cm. Het hoofd van het kind heeft een omtrek van 60 cm.
[Her waist girth is 60 cm.] [The child’s head girth is 60 cm.]
Het TV-programma duurde 10 minuten. De wasmiddelen-reclame duurde 10 minuten.
[The TV show lasted 10 minutes.] [The detergent commercial lasted 10 minutes.]
De lift had 120 kilo draagkracht. De man woog 120 kilo.
[The elevator had a capacity of 120 kilos.] [The man weighed 120 kilos.]
Er zaten 80 mensen in het stadion. Er zaten 80 mensen in de woonkamer.
[80 people were seated in the stadium.] [80 people were present in the living room.]
De gang was 60 cm in de breedte. De vader had een karper van 60 cm gevangen.
[The hallway was 60 cm wide.] [The father caught a 60 cm carp.]
Met oud en nieuw had hij vier biertjes gedronken. Hij stapte achter het stuur nadat hij vier biertjes had gedronken.
[On new year’s eve he drank 4 beers.] [He got behind the wheel after drinking 4 beers.]
De kippen van de boer hadden 5 eieren gelegd in een maand. Mijn oma bakte 5 eieren voor mijn opa.
[In a month, the farmer’s chickens had laid 5 eggs.] [My grandma baked 5 eggs for my granddad.]
Hij had na een maand 40 km met zijn auto gereden. Hij fietste elke dag 40 km.
[After a month he had driven 40 km in his car.] [He biked 40 km every day.]
Zijn appartement was 16 vierkante meter. Het balkon was 16 vierkante meter.
[His apartment was 16 square meters.] [The balcony was 16 square meters.]
In anderhalf uur kan je in Ierland zijn. Hij was anderhalf uur te laat op ons afspraakje.
[You can get to Ireland in one an a half hours.] [He was one and a half hours late on our date.]
Hij was in een jaar 1 kilo aangekomen. De bakker had een croissantje gebakken van 1 kilo.
[He had gained 1 kilo in a year.] [The baker had baked a croissant that was 1 kilo.]
Er lagen 5 bananen in de kist bij de groenteboer. Hij sneed 5 bananen in plakjes in zijn joghurt.
[The crate at the greengrocer had 5 bananas.] [He sliced 5 bananas in his yogurt.]
De kast was 30 cm breed. De poedel had een bot in zijn bek van 30 cm.
[The closet was 30 cm wide.] [The poodle held a 30 cm bone in it’s mouth.]
Hij dronk 4 koppen koffie per week. Hij dronk 4 koppen koffie per dag.
[He drank 4 cups of coffee a week.] [He drank 4 cups of coffee a day.]
De patatjes zijn 3 cm in de lengte. De nagels van mijn vriendin zijn 3 cm.
[The chips were 3 cm long.] [My friend’s nails are 3 cm.]
Het vliegveld was 5 km van mijn huis vandaan. De dichtstbijzijnde supermarkt was 5 km van mijn huis.
[The airport was 5 km from my house.] [The closest supermarket was 5 km from my house.]
De kerk heeft een omtrek van 12 meter. De boom heeft een omtrek van 12 meter.
[The church’s circumference is 12 meters.] [The tree’s circumference is 12 meters.]
In een kwartier had ze het avondeten gemaakt. In een kwartier had ze de vissen gevoerd.
[In a quarter of an hour she made dinner.] [In a quarter of an hour she fed the fish.]
De oude vrouw kocht een zak met anderhalf kilo aardappels. De oude vrouw kocht een zak met anderhalf kilo koekjes.
[The old lady bought a one and a half kilo bag of potatoes.] [The old lady bought a one and a half kilo bag of biscuits.]
Er stonden 5 paar schoenen in de winkel. Ze nam 5 paar schoenen mee op vakantie.
(Continued)
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[There were 5 pairs of shoes in the shop.] [She brought 5 pairs of shoes on her vacation.]
De file waar we in stonden was 1 km. De lengte van de tuin was 1 km.
[The traffic jam we were in was 1 km.] [The length of the garden was 1 km.]
De kok deed een lepeltje sambal in de pan met bami. De jongen deed een lepeltje sambal in zijn kop soep.
[The chef put one teaspoon of sambal in the pot of noodles.] [The boy put one teaspoon of sambal in his cup of soup.]
Na vijf minuten had ze besloten naar welk land ze zou gaan. Na vijf minuten had ze besloten wat ze wilde drinken.
[After 5 minutes she had decided to which country she would go.] [After 5 minutes she had decided what she wanted to drink.]
De gouden oorbellen kostten 10 euro. De bloemkool kostte 10 euro.
[The golden earrings cost 10 euro.] [The cauliflower cost 10 euro.]
Hij had 2 maanden in dat huis gewoond. Een vriend van ons bleef 2 maanden logeren.
[He had lived in the house for 2 months.] [Our friend stayed at our home for 2 months.]
De man werkte op woensdag 2 uur. De student stond 2 uur op de bus te wachten.
[The man worked two hours on Wednesdays.] [The student had been waiting for the bus for two hours.]
Voor het buurtfeest kocht hij 6 zakken chips. Voor bij de film kocht hij 6 zakken chips.
[For the neighborhood party he bought 6 bags of crisps.] [For during the film he bought 6 bags of crisps.]
Er zaten 7 mensen in de trein. Er zaten 7 mensen in de taxi.
[7 people were on the train.] [7 people were in the taxi.]
De man waste zich 2 keer per week. De man waste zijn auto 2 keer per week.
[The man washed (himself) twice a week.] [The man washed his car twice a week.]
De student spreekt zijn huisgenoot 1 keer in de maand. De student spreekt zijn studiebegeleider 1 keer in de maand.
[The student talks to his housemate 1 time a month.] [The student talks to his school counselor 1 time a month.]
De casiere van de supermarkt had die dag 35 klanten. De chirurg had die dag 35 operaties.
[The supermarket cashier had 35 customers that day.] [The surgeon had 35 surgeries that day.]
Mijn broer gaat 1 keer per maand naar de sportschool. Mijn broer gaat 1 keer per maand naar de tandarts.
[My brother goes to the gym once a month.] [My brother goes to the dentist once a month.]
Er staat 20 milimeter water in de badkuip. Er staat 20 milimeter water in de huiskamer.
[The bathtub has 20 millimeters of water.] [The living room has 20 millimeters of water.]
De topsporter wandelde 10 km. Mijn oma liep met haar rollator 10 km.
[The sports star walked 10 km.] [My grandma walked 10 km with her rollator.]
De man parkeerde de auto 1 cm over de witte lijn. De zuster prikte 1 cm naast de ader.
[The man parked his car 1 cm over the line.] [The nurse injected 1 cm off the vein.]
Sentences used in experiments 1, 3, and 4. Approximate translations are given in brackets.
Few Many
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